Framework
Sample deliverables
Redacted examples of how findings, evidence, and diagrams are packaged for stakeholder review. Figures represent typical enterprise control patterns, not a live engagement. Additional diagram sets below cover RAG and agentic patterns, plus extended developer-tooling context.
← Back to FrameworkSample deliverable 1
Illustrative outputs from a structured review
Redacted examples showing how findings, evidence, and diagrams are packaged for stakeholder review. The findings register uses the Rapid Readiness layout (ID, Category, Description, Severity, Status, with Finding, Evidence Collected, and Remediation Action on expand). Figures represent typical enterprise control patterns, not a live engagement.
Rapid Readiness Reviews focus on critical and high severity findings, not full structured framework depth. A Full Deployment Assurance Review applies full framework coverage across core domains and overlays (as scoped), with architecture diagrams and a complete remediation roadmap.
Critical and high findings: post-review state
ID
Category
Description
Severity
Status
RAG-001
Access Control
Retrieval boundary not scoped to user classification
Critical
Open – Pilot Blocker
Finding
The retrieval layer returns document chunks based on semantic similarity only. No user role or data classification check is applied at query time. A user cleared for public-facing policy documents can retrieve confidential HR or legal corpus chunks if the embedding similarity score is high enough.
Evidence Collected
Test queries from a restricted user account returned confidential-classified chunks (EV-R01). Vector index configuration reviewed; no metadata filter on classification field at retrieval (EV-R01b).
Remediation Action
Add metadata filter to retrieval query requiring classification ≤ user_clearance_level before chunk is returned. Enforce at the retrieval API layer, not the UI. Validate with test user set spanning all classification levels before pilot go-live.
RAG-002
Data Protection
No PII detection in document ingestion pipeline
Critical
Open – Pilot Blocker
Finding
Documents are chunked and embedded without a PII detection pass. HR policies, benefits guides, and contract templates containing employee names, ID numbers, and compensation data are indexed verbatim into the vector store and retrievable via natural language queries.
Evidence Collected
Query test returning employee compensation data from a benefits document chunk (EV-R02). Ingestion pipeline code review; no PII scan step present (EV-R02b). Vector store sample export showing unredacted personal data in chunk content (EV-R02c).
Remediation Action
Add PII detection step to ingestion pipeline before chunking. Redact or replace detected PII with entity-type tokens (e.g. [EMPLOYEE_NAME]). Re-index all existing corpus documents after remediation. Validate with regex and NER-based test suite before pilot.
RAG-003
Monitoring
Query logging does not capture retrieved chunk IDs
High
Open – Remediation Required
Finding
Query logs record the user ID, timestamp, and natural language query but not which document chunks were retrieved and returned. An incident involving retrieval of sensitive content cannot be reconstructed after the fact.
Evidence Collected
Log schema reviewed; chunk_ids field absent from query log record (EV-R03). Confirmed with platform team: chunk IDs are not currently passed to the logging layer.
Remediation Action
Add chunk_ids, source_document_ids, and classification_level to query log record. Forward to SIEM. Retain for 90 days minimum. Required before production gate; acceptable at pilot with compensating control documented.
RAG-004
Data Governance
Vector store contains stale documents post-policy update
High
Open – Remediation Required
Finding
The ingestion pipeline runs on a weekly schedule. Policy documents updated in the source SharePoint library are not reflected in the vector store for up to 7 days. During review, two superseded HR policies from Q1 2025 were still retrievable and returned as current answers.
Evidence Collected
Query returning superseded leave policy with incorrect accrual rates (EV-R04). SharePoint version history confirming document was updated 11 days prior (EV-R04b). Ingestion schedule config showing 7-day cadence (EV-R04c).
Remediation Action
Move to event-driven ingestion triggered on document update in source library. Add document version hash to chunk metadata; surface source version and date in UI response. Implement tombstoning for deleted or superseded documents.
RAG-005
Access Control
Vector store API key not rotated since initial setup
High
Closed – Evidence Collected
Finding
The vector database API key was created at project inception 8 months prior and had never been rotated. Key had no expiry set. The key was stored in a plaintext .env file on the ingestion server with no vault integration.
Evidence Collected
API key creation date confirmed in vendor console (EV-R05). Post-remediation: new key issued with 90-day expiry, stored in HashiCorp Vault, injected at runtime (EV-R05b). Old key revoked and revocation confirmed (EV-R05c).
Remediation Action
Completed. Key rotated, 90-day rotation policy set, Vault integration implemented. Rotation scheduled in change management calendar.
RAG-006
Data Governance
No DPA covering vector store provider
High
Closed – Evidence Collected
Finding
The vector database vendor (third-party managed service) was not in the vendor register and had no executed DPA. Confidential internal documents including HR policies were being processed and stored in a third-party infrastructure with no contractual data processing agreement.
Evidence Collected
Vendor register reviewed; vendor absent (EV-R06). Post-remediation: DPA executed and filed (EV-R06b). Vendor added to register with annual review date (EV-R06c).
Remediation Action
Completed. DPA signed. Vendor added to register. Data residency confirmed as us-east-1. Legal sign-off on file.
Sample deliverable 2
RAG pipeline: enterprise knowledge base
Retrieval-augmented generation: logical layers, end-to-end query flow, failure handling, and document lifecycle with content governance. Use the same tabs as Sample deliverable 1 to move between views.
Critical and high findings: post-review state
ID
Category
Description
Severity
Status
RAG-001
Access Control
Retrieval boundary not scoped to user classification
Critical
Open – Pilot Blocker
Finding
The retrieval layer returns document chunks based on semantic similarity only. No user role or data classification check is applied at query time. A user cleared for public-facing policy documents can retrieve confidential HR or legal corpus chunks if the embedding similarity score is high enough.
Evidence Collected
Test queries from a restricted user account returned confidential-classified chunks (EV-R01). Vector index configuration reviewed; no metadata filter on classification field at retrieval (EV-R01b).
Remediation Action
Add metadata filter to retrieval query requiring classification ≤ user_clearance_level before chunk is returned. Enforce at the retrieval API layer, not the UI. Validate with test user set spanning all classification levels before pilot go-live.
RAG-002
Data Protection
No PII detection in document ingestion pipeline
Critical
Open – Pilot Blocker
Finding
Documents are chunked and embedded without a PII detection pass. HR policies, benefits guides, and contract templates containing employee names, ID numbers, and compensation data are indexed verbatim into the vector store and retrievable via natural language queries.
Evidence Collected
Query test returning employee compensation data from a benefits document chunk (EV-R02). Ingestion pipeline code review; no PII scan step present (EV-R02b). Vector store sample export showing unredacted personal data in chunk content (EV-R02c).
Remediation Action
Add PII detection step to ingestion pipeline before chunking. Redact or replace detected PII with entity-type tokens (e.g. [EMPLOYEE_NAME]). Re-index all existing corpus documents after remediation. Validate with regex and NER-based test suite before pilot.
RAG-003
Monitoring
Query logging does not capture retrieved chunk IDs
High
Open – Remediation Required
Finding
Query logs record the user ID, timestamp, and natural language query but not which document chunks were retrieved and returned. An incident involving retrieval of sensitive content cannot be reconstructed after the fact.
Evidence Collected
Log schema reviewed; chunk_ids field absent from query log record (EV-R03). Confirmed with platform team: chunk IDs are not currently passed to the logging layer.
Remediation Action
Add chunk_ids, source_document_ids, and classification_level to query log record. Forward to SIEM. Retain for 90 days minimum. Required before production gate; acceptable at pilot with compensating control documented.
RAG-004
Data Governance
Vector store contains stale documents post-policy update
High
Open – Remediation Required
Finding
The ingestion pipeline runs on a weekly schedule. Policy documents updated in the source SharePoint library are not reflected in the vector store for up to 7 days. During review, two superseded HR policies from Q1 2025 were still retrievable and returned as current answers.
Evidence Collected
Query returning superseded leave policy with incorrect accrual rates (EV-R04). SharePoint version history confirming document was updated 11 days prior (EV-R04b). Ingestion schedule config showing 7-day cadence (EV-R04c).
Remediation Action
Move to event-driven ingestion triggered on document update in source library. Add document version hash to chunk metadata; surface source version and date in UI response. Implement tombstoning for deleted or superseded documents.
RAG-005
Access Control
Vector store API key not rotated since initial setup
High
Closed – Evidence Collected
Finding
The vector database API key was created at project inception 8 months prior and had never been rotated. Key had no expiry set. The key was stored in a plaintext .env file on the ingestion server with no vault integration.
Evidence Collected
API key creation date confirmed in vendor console (EV-R05). Post-remediation: new key issued with 90-day expiry, stored in HashiCorp Vault, injected at runtime (EV-R05b). Old key revoked and revocation confirmed (EV-R05c).
Remediation Action
Completed. Key rotated, 90-day rotation policy set, Vault integration implemented. Rotation scheduled in change management calendar.
RAG-006
Data Governance
No DPA covering vector store provider
High
Closed – Evidence Collected
Finding
The vector database vendor (third-party managed service) was not in the vendor register and had no executed DPA. Confidential internal documents including HR policies were being processed and stored in a third-party infrastructure with no contractual data processing agreement.
Evidence Collected
Vendor register reviewed; vendor absent (EV-R06). Post-remediation: DPA executed and filed (EV-R06b). Vendor added to register with annual review date (EV-R06c).
Remediation Action
Completed. DPA signed. Vendor added to register. Data residency confirmed as us-east-1. Legal sign-off on file.
Sample deliverable 3
Agentic AI: workflow automation
Agent flows with CRM, email, and ticketing: architecture, approval-gated actions, failure paths, and governance. Tabs mirror Sample deliverable 1 for a consistent review layout.
Findings register: post-review state
ID
Category
Description
Severity
Status
AGT-001
Agentic Controls
Action scope not bounded: agent can write to all CRM records
Critical
Open – POC Blocker
Finding
The agent's CRM integration uses an API credential with org-wide write scope. No record-level or object-type restrictions are applied. During testing the agent modified records outside its intended workflow scope when given an ambiguous instruction, updating 14 opportunity records not associated with the test case.
Evidence Collected
CRM API credential scope export showing org-wide write (EV-A01). Test session log showing unintended record modifications (EV-A01b). Blast radius analysis: 4,200 production records writable by current credential (EV-A01c).
Remediation Action
Scope agent CRM credential to specific object types (Opportunity, Task) and record ownership filter (assigned_to = agent_service_account). Implement pre-action confirmation for any write affecting more than one record. Validate with permission boundary test suite before POC.
AGT-002
Agentic Controls
No human-in-the-loop gate for high-value actions
Critical
Open – POC Blocker
Finding
The agent executes all workflow actions autonomously including sending external emails, creating contracts, and closing support tickets. No approval gate is triggered for actions above a defined value or risk threshold. External email was sent to a customer during testing without human review of the draft.
Evidence Collected
Test session log showing autonomous external email send (EV-A02). Workflow configuration reviewed; no approval step defined for any action type (EV-A02b).
Remediation Action
Define action risk tiers. Tier 1 (read, internal note): autonomous. Tier 2 (external communication, record close): human approval required within 30 minutes before execution. Tier 3 (contract creation, financial action): named approver required. Implement approval queue in workflow orchestration layer.
AGT-003
Access Control
Agent credential stored in plaintext environment variable
Critical
Open – POC Blocker
Finding
API credentials for CRM, ticketing platform, and email service are stored as plaintext environment variables in the agent runtime container. The .env file is committed to the application repository. Any developer with repo access can extract credentials with org-wide write scope across three systems.
Evidence Collected
Repository .env file containing live credentials (EV-A03). Git history showing credential present in 23 commits over 4 months (EV-A03b). Blast radius: credentials grant write access to CRM, ticketing, and email for entire organisation.
Remediation Action
Rotate all three credentials immediately. Move to secrets manager (AWS Secrets Manager or HashiCorp Vault). Remove .env from repository and add to .gitignore. Audit git history and treat as compromised until rotation confirmed. Implement secret scanning in CI/CD to prevent recurrence.
AGT-004
Agentic Controls
No rollback mechanism for failed multi-step workflows
High
Open – Remediation Required
Finding
When a multi-step workflow fails mid-execution (e.g. CRM write succeeds, ticket creation fails), no compensation logic exists. Partial state is left in production systems with no automated notification to a human operator. In testing, 3 of 12 failure scenarios produced inconsistent state across systems.
Evidence Collected
Test failure logs showing partial execution states (EV-A04). Workflow orchestration code reviewed; no saga/compensation pattern implemented (EV-A04b).
Remediation Action
Implement compensating transactions for all multi-step workflows. On failure: reverse completed steps where reversible, flag non-reversible steps for human review, alert on-call operator with workflow ID and failure point. Add circuit breaker to prevent retry storms.
AGT-005
Monitoring
Agent action audit trail does not capture reasoning chain
High
Open – Remediation Required
Finding
The audit log records which actions were executed and their outcomes but not the model's reasoning chain or the intermediate steps considered before the action was taken. An incident investigation cannot determine why the agent chose a specific action or what context it acted on.
Evidence Collected
Audit log schema reviewed; reasoning_chain and candidate_actions fields absent (EV-A05). Compared against framework control MON-07 requirement for agentic deployments.
Remediation Action
Log model reasoning chain, candidate actions considered, and selected action with confidence score for each workflow step. Store in append-only audit log with 90-day retention. Required for production gate; pilot acceptable with compensating manual review process.
AGT-006
Agentic Controls
Prompt injection via CRM record content not mitigated
High
Open – Escalated
Finding
The agent reads CRM record content (contact notes, email threads, opportunity descriptions) directly into its context window. A test using a crafted instruction embedded in a contact note field caused the agent to send an unauthorised email. External actors with access to submit contact forms can inject into agent context.
Evidence Collected
Proof-of-concept injection test: crafted contact note caused agent to execute unauthorised email action (EV-A06). Attack surface analysis: 3 external-facing input paths can write to CRM fields read by agent (EV-A06b).
Remediation Action
Two mitigations under architecture review: (1) Sanitise all CRM field content before inclusion in agent context: strips instruction-like patterns. (2) Structural separation: agent reads data fields only, never freetext fields. Decision required from product and security before pilot.
AGT-007
Data Governance
No DPA covering model provider for agentic use case
High
Closed – Evidence Collected
Finding
Existing DPA with model provider covered interactive use only. Agentic deployment passes CRM data including customer contact information and deal values to the model as context. The DPA did not explicitly cover automated processing of customer personal data at this scale.
Evidence Collected
Original DPA reviewed; agentic/automated use not in scope (EV-A07). Updated DPA executed covering agentic processing of customer personal data (EV-A07b). Legal sign-off memo on file (EV-A07c).
Remediation Action
Completed. DPA updated and executed. Annual review trigger set. Data minimisation review scheduled.
AGT-008
Access Control
Agent service account has interactive login enabled
High
Closed – Evidence Collected
Finding
The agent service account in the IdP had password authentication and interactive login enabled. A compromised credential could be used to authenticate as the agent service account and perform actions with its full CRM/ticketing/email write scope without triggering agent workflow controls.
Evidence Collected
IdP account configuration showing password auth enabled and no login restriction (EV-A08). Post-remediation: account converted to service principal, password auth disabled, machine-only authentication enforced (EV-A08b).
Remediation Action
Completed. Service account converted to machine identity. Interactive login disabled. Certificate-based authentication only.
AGT-009
Agentic Controls
No rate limiting on agent action execution
Medium
Open – Remediation Required
Finding
No per-user or global rate limit is applied to agent action execution. A runaway workflow or a prompt injection attack could trigger thousands of CRM writes or email sends before a human notices. No circuit breaker exists to halt execution above a threshold.
Evidence Collected
Workflow orchestration config reviewed; no rate limit or circuit breaker configuration present (EV-A09).
Remediation Action
Implement per-session action limit (max 50 actions per workflow run). Add global daily action cap with alert at 80% threshold. Circuit breaker halts all execution and pages on-call if limit exceeded within a 10-minute window.
AGT-010
Policy
Acceptable use policy does not cover agentic AI
Medium
Closed – Evidence Collected
Finding
Existing AUP covered interactive AI assistant use only. Agentic AI introduces materially different risk: the model acts autonomously on behalf of users. AUP did not define prohibited task categories, required human oversight checkpoints, or accountability for agent-initiated actions.
Evidence Collected
AUP v2.1 reviewed; agentic use not addressed (EV-A10). Updated AUP v2.2 executed, signed by 18 pilot users (EV-A10b).
Remediation Action
Completed. AUP updated. Prohibited task categories defined: financial transactions above $500, HR record modifications, contract execution, external regulatory communications. Pilot user training completed.
AGT-011
Supply Chain
Agent framework dependency not in vulnerability scanning
Medium
Closed – Evidence Collected
Finding
The agent orchestration framework and its transitive dependencies were not included in the organisation's Snyk scanning scope. The framework has had several high-severity CVEs in the past 12 months related to prompt injection and unsafe serialisation.
Evidence Collected
Snyk project list: agent repo absent (EV-A11). Post-remediation: repo added to Snyk, current scan showing 0 critical, 1 high (accepted with memo) (EV-A11b).
Remediation Action
Completed. Repo added to Snyk. 1 high CVE risk-accepted with named approver. Patch SLA: critical 7 days, high 30 days. Weekly scan scheduled.
AGT-012
Monitoring
No alerting on anomalous action patterns
Medium
Open – Remediation Required
Finding
Agent action logs are collected but no anomaly detection rules exist. Bulk record modification, repeated failed actions, or action types outside the normal distribution would not trigger an alert. Security Ops has no visibility into agent behaviour without manual log review.
Evidence Collected
SIEM reviewed; no agent-specific detection rules present (EV-A12). Action log volume and type distribution baseline documented for rule construction (EV-A12b).
Remediation Action
Build SIEM detection rules: (1) >10 write actions in 5 minutes, (2) action type not seen in prior 30-day baseline, (3) 3+ consecutive action failures. Alert to Security Ops Slack channel and on-call. Required before production gate.
AGT-013
Change Management
Agent prompt updates not in change control
Medium
Closed – Evidence Collected
Finding
System prompt and tool definition updates were being deployed directly to production by the product team without change control review. A prompt change in week 3 of review silently altered the agent's escalation behaviour. The change was not documented and took 2 days to identify as the cause of a behavioural shift.
Evidence Collected
Prompt version history showing direct production edits without PR (EV-A13). Post-remediation: prompts moved to version-controlled repo with PR review required (EV-A13b).
Remediation Action
Completed. System prompts and tool definitions version-controlled in dedicated repo. PR required with security review for changes affecting action scope or escalation logic. Staging environment validation required before production deploy.
AGT-014
Agentic Controls
No sandbox environment for agent testing before production
Medium
Open – Remediation Required
Finding
All agent development and testing has been done against production CRM and ticketing environments using test records. No isolated sandbox with representative data exists. A mis-scoped test workflow during the review period modified 6 live opportunity records before the test was stopped.
Evidence Collected
CRM audit log showing live record modifications during test session (EV-A14). No sandbox environment in infrastructure inventory (EV-A14b).
Remediation Action
Provision CRM and ticketing sandbox environments with synthetic data. All agent development, testing, and QA must use sandbox only. Production access requires explicit deployment workflow with change ticket. Required before pilot expansion beyond initial 5 users.
Sample Deliverable: Rapid Readiness Review
RAG Pipeline: Enterprise Knowledge Base
Representative output from a Rapid Readiness Review of an enterprise RAG deployment used for internal policy and compliance Q&A. Critical and high severity only. Client details removed.
Rapid Readiness Reviews focus on critical and high severity findings, not full structured framework depth. A Full Deployment Assurance Review applies full framework coverage across core domains and overlays (as scoped), with architecture diagrams and a complete remediation roadmap.
Conditional Go
Recommendation
POC approved with conditions. Pilot gate blocked pending two critical closures.
The RAG pipeline architecture is sound and the vendor DPA is in order. Two critical findings must be closed before pilot expansion: retrieval access controls are not scoped to the user's data classification level, and the document ingestion pipeline has no PII detection before chunking. Three high-severity findings are assigned with target dates and do not block POC.
Conditions for pilot approval
- Retrieval boundary controls scoped to user role and data classification; evidence required before pilot go-live
- PII detection and redaction layer added to ingestion pipeline; evidence required before pilot go-live
- Hallucination risk accepted in writing by data owner for regulated content categories
Critical and high findings: post-review state
ID
Category
Description
Severity
Status
RAG-001
Access Control
Retrieval boundary not scoped to user classification
Critical
Open – Pilot Blocker
Finding
The retrieval layer returns document chunks based on semantic similarity only. No user role or data classification check is applied at query time. A user cleared for public-facing policy documents can retrieve confidential HR or legal corpus chunks if the embedding similarity score is high enough.
Evidence Collected
Test queries from a restricted user account returned confidential-classified chunks (EV-R01). Vector index configuration reviewed; no metadata filter on classification field at retrieval (EV-R01b).
Remediation Action
Add metadata filter to retrieval query requiring classification ≤ user_clearance_level before chunk is returned. Enforce at the retrieval API layer, not the UI. Validate with test user set spanning all classification levels before pilot go-live.
RAG-002
Data Protection
No PII detection in document ingestion pipeline
Critical
Open – Pilot Blocker
Finding
Documents are chunked and embedded without a PII detection pass. HR policies, benefits guides, and contract templates containing employee names, ID numbers, and compensation data are indexed verbatim into the vector store and retrievable via natural language queries.
Evidence Collected
Query test returning employee compensation data from a benefits document chunk (EV-R02). Ingestion pipeline code review; no PII scan step present (EV-R02b). Vector store sample export showing unredacted personal data in chunk content (EV-R02c).
Remediation Action
Add PII detection step to ingestion pipeline before chunking. Redact or replace detected PII with entity-type tokens (e.g. [EMPLOYEE_NAME]). Re-index all existing corpus documents after remediation. Validate with regex and NER-based test suite before pilot.
RAG-003
Monitoring
Query logging does not capture retrieved chunk IDs
High
Open – Remediation Required
Finding
Query logs record the user ID, timestamp, and natural language query but not which document chunks were retrieved and returned. An incident involving retrieval of sensitive content cannot be reconstructed after the fact.
Evidence Collected
Log schema reviewed; chunk_ids field absent from query log record (EV-R03). Confirmed with platform team: chunk IDs are not currently passed to the logging layer.
Remediation Action
Add chunk_ids, source_document_ids, and classification_level to query log record. Forward to SIEM. Retain for 90 days minimum. Required before production gate; acceptable at pilot with compensating control documented.
RAG-004
Data Governance
Vector store contains stale documents post-policy update
High
Open – Remediation Required
Finding
The ingestion pipeline runs on a weekly schedule. Policy documents updated in the source SharePoint library are not reflected in the vector store for up to 7 days. During review, two superseded HR policies from Q1 2025 were still retrievable and returned as current answers.
Evidence Collected
Query returning superseded leave policy with incorrect accrual rates (EV-R04). SharePoint version history confirming document was updated 11 days prior (EV-R04b). Ingestion schedule config showing 7-day cadence (EV-R04c).
Remediation Action
Move to event-driven ingestion triggered on document update in source library. Add document version hash to chunk metadata; surface source version and date in UI response. Implement tombstoning for deleted or superseded documents.
RAG-005
Access Control
Vector store API key not rotated since initial setup
High
Closed – Evidence Collected
Finding
The vector database API key was created at project inception 8 months prior and had never been rotated. Key had no expiry set. The key was stored in a plaintext .env file on the ingestion server with no vault integration.
Evidence Collected
API key creation date confirmed in vendor console (EV-R05). Post-remediation: new key issued with 90-day expiry, stored in HashiCorp Vault, injected at runtime (EV-R05b). Old key revoked and revocation confirmed (EV-R05c).
Remediation Action
Completed. Key rotated, 90-day rotation policy set, Vault integration implemented. Rotation scheduled in change management calendar.
RAG-006
Data Governance
No DPA covering vector store provider
High
Closed – Evidence Collected
Finding
The vector database vendor (third-party managed service) was not in the vendor register and had no executed DPA. Confidential internal documents including HR policies were being processed and stored in a third-party infrastructure with no contractual data processing agreement.
Evidence Collected
Vendor register reviewed; vendor absent (EV-R06). Post-remediation: DPA executed and filed (EV-R06b). Vendor added to register with annual review date (EV-R06c).
Remediation Action
Completed. DPA signed. Vendor added to register. Data residency confirmed as us-east-1. Legal sign-off on file.
Evidence checklist: approval stakeholders
Items required for pilot gate sign-off. Delivered to security, privacy, and architecture review board.
RAG-001: Retrieval boundary control
Test results showing classification-scoped retrieval passing for all user role levels
RAG-002: PII detection in ingestion
Pipeline scan results confirming PII redaction; re-indexed corpus sample with entity tokens
RAG-004: Stale document handling
Event-driven ingestion trigger configured; superseded document tombstoning validated
RAG-005: API key rotation
New key with 90-day expiry; Vault integration screenshot; old key revocation confirmation
RAG-006: DPA with vector store provider
Executed DPA; vendor register entry; data residency confirmation
Hallucination risk acceptance
Written risk acceptance signed by data owner covering regulated content categories
Next step: a short discovery call
We use it to confirm deployment fit, outline review scope, and match you to the right packaged offer. No engagement starts until you decide to proceed.